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I.

INTRODUCTION.

The Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association ("IPAA"), by and through Jan M. Bennetts,
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney; James K. Dickinson, Ada County Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, Standards and Practices Division; Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting
Attorney; Bryan Taylor, Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney; and Grant Loebs, Twin Falls
County Prosecuting Attorney, and pursuant to the Court's Order granting IPAA's request to file
an amicus curiae brief, submits the following for the Court's consideration. IPAA will focus on
the district court's findings relating to special prosecuting attorney Marc Haws, then working as
a Deputy Attorney General. Because of this narrow focus, IPAA refers the Court to Appellant
State of Idaho's brief for a broader discussion of the facts and history of the proceedings.

II.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS HAVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN
STATE BAR PROCEEDINGS THAT ARE IMPLICATED BY POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PROCEEDINGS.

The IP AA represents the interests of prosecuting attorneys statewide. Based upon the
keen interest of its constituency in the issues surrounding accusations of this type, the IP AA
Board of Directors applied for, and was granted permission to appear as amicus curiae and file
this brief. Given that IP AA members are the sole targets of prosecutorial error, the IP AA is
uniquely positioned to share its statewide perspective on this topic.
Unfortunately, in most instances where prosecutorial error allegations are reviewed by
this Court, the prosecutor is not personally represented with regard to the accusations. On appeal,
the State is represented by a Deputy Attorney General, the Defendant is represented by a Deputy
State Appellate Defender or private counsel, but the individual accused of error or misconduct

generally has no counsel. 1 When such allegations are raised, despite the significant property
rights (continued/future employment) and reputation, honor and integrity interests 2 at stake, 3
unless the prosecutor is allowed to raise his or her personal defense to the allegations, he or she
may be deprived of his/her due process 4 right to disprove such allegations at the trial level, postconviction level, appellate level or even in a State Bar proceeding.
Because of the understandably great deference given to findings or even comments by
any court, Bar Counsel will almost inevitably consider the same when evaluating whether to file
a complaint against a prosecuting attorney. Given the import of such determinations, it is vitally
important that the record be developed accurately, which necessarily requires input from the
accused prosecutor. Even if a State Bar proceeding concludes in an exoneration, the appellate
decision, and the attendant employment and/or reputation harm flowing from the decision ( even
where the decision is mistaken), are potentially permanent.

That is why the accused prosecutor

must be accorded a due process right, and why a court's erroneous consideration of evidence
must be corrected. Without correction, a prosecutor is forever saddled with a record susceptible
to misinterpretation by the public and Bar Counsel.
1 The Attorney General's Office takes the position that it represents the State's interests, not the prosecutor or the
~rosecutor's interests.
"Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91
S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed. 2d 515 (1971 ); cited in Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 827, 203 P.3d 122 l (2009).
3 Both trial courts and this Court may impose various sanctions against attorneys. Further, the Idaho Bar Association
may bring an action pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, e.g. l.R.P.C. 3.3 or 3.8, and can likewise
impose sanctions up to and including disbarment; such allegations may also result in a loss of employment.
4 "'An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.' Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950). We have described 'the root requirement' of the Due Process Clause as being 'that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest."' Cleveland Board uf
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed. 2d 494 (1985).
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III.

THE POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS.

In the present post-conviction case, the district court bifurcated summary judgment
proceedings; first, considering whether the Tira Arbaugh letter was withheld or concealed from
Respondent; and second, if it was, whether state agents played a role in the letter's being
withheld or concealed. The district court concluded both questions were properly answered in
the affirmative. Charboneau Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 10, 2014. R. Part
3, p. 142. During the evidentiary hearing, the district court agreed that the "knowledge of family
members of facts related to either the underlying claims or matters having to do with the criminal
trial would be more appropriately raised at a subsequent time." Evidentiary Hearing Transcript
("Evid. Tr."), p. 263, L.l. 9-21.
The district court reviewed a number of items in considering whether Haws was involved
in withholding or concealing information from Respondent, including Exhibit 4, the handwritten
note the district court concluded was written by Department of Corrections employee De Wayne
Shedd ("Shedd"), or at least acknowledged per his signature below the following statement:
Per Tim McNeese from the AG's office/instructed to monitor all of inmate
Charboneau's personal/legal mail. All incoming and outgoing legal mail, if a
letter arrives at ICI-0 for Charboneau from Larry Gold, a former sheriff of
Jerome County, seize it without notifying Charboneau, look for any documents
depicting the name Tira Arbaugh, confiscate any such documents, and notify
McNeese immediately. If McNeese is not available then contact another attorney
Marc Haws at the Federal Court Building in Boise. His phone number and
address is in the directory on my desk. Notified Lt. Unger and he agreed to help
me monitor Charboneau's mail.
R. Part 3, p. 121. Shedd worked as a library specialist at the Orofino Department of
Corrections facility from March 1997 to May 2007. Evid. Tr., p. 190, L. 11
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p. 19 L L

6. Shedd denied knowing Marc Haws. Evid. Tr., p. 271, L. 25 - p. 272, L. 11. Timothy
McNeese worked as a Deputy Attorney General, assigned to the Department of
Corrections, from January 1984 to January 2006, when he retired. Evid. Tr., p. 439, LI.
16-22.
During the evidentiary hearing on the first portion of the bifurcated proceedings,
Haws testified he had been a Deputy Attorney General in charge of the Criminal
Division. Evid. Tr., p. 231, L.l. 4-9. He testified he had prosecuted Respondent but had
no involvement with Respondent's case after the first sentencing. Id, at L.l. 14-23. He
denied knowing Shedd or knowing of Shedd and testified that he did not see the Tira
Arbaugh letter until sometime during the pendency of this post-conviction relief case.

Id, p. 232 at L.l. 7-21. Haws denied instructing anyone to hide or conceal evidence from
Respondent; he testified that he had had no contact with Idaho Department of Corrections
personnel about Respondent's case since leaving the Attorney General's Office shortly
after completing his work in the criminal case. Evid. Tr., p. 432, L. 9

p. 433, L. 14.

During cross-examination, counsel for Respondent attempted to question Haws on his
involvement in "the prosecution of Mr. Paradis." Evid. Tr., p. 436, L.l. 10-12. After a relevance
objection by the State's attorney, an offer of proof was submitted by Respondent's counsel: "I
was going to ask Mr. Haws if he was involved in any kind of concealment of exculpatory
evidence from the Paradis prosecution." Id, at L.l. 15-18. Further argument was presented by
Respondent's counsel:

"The only relevance, Your Honor, is I believe he was involved in a

Brady violation in the Paradis case. This followed shortly after. I think I'm allowed to inquire
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whether he was involved in similar conduct in the Charboneau case." Id at p. 436, L. 23 to p.
437, L. 2. The district court asked: "Isn't this just an offer of propensity evidence, did it once,
did it twice?" Id at p. 437, L.l. 7-8. After an affirmative response from Charboneau's counsel,
the district court stated: "Isn't that what 404(b) excludes? This is not a criminal case. There's
no jury present.

You're not offering it to prove something other than propensity.

I'm not

hearing, such as motive, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake or accident, planned knowledge,
identity." Id at L.l. 9-15. After the district court asked for an additional offer of proof, and was
provided more details from the Paradis case and how the allegations in Charboneau's case were
similar to findings in Paradis, the court responded: ''You made your offer. I'm going to exclude
it. I'll sustain the objection." Id at p. 437, L. 17 - p. 438, L. 5.
The district court did not make any finding as to whether prison guard William Unger.
Deputy Attorney General Timothy McNeese, or Haws were involved in the concealment or
withholding of the letter. "The inferences and conclusions the Court draws from the evidence is
that McNeese or someone in a similar capacity directed Shedd to do what he did.'' R. Part 3, p.
136.
The court cited three reasons for not making a finding:
[N]o such finding is required. The Court need not determine the extent of any
conspiracy to seize or confiscate Charboneau's mail. It is sut1icient for purposes
of this case, at this time, to determine only that someone at IDOC did so, and did
not act alone. Second, McNeese has been sanctioned before by the federal court
for his conduct involving the letter seized by Shedd in the Gomez case, and he
represented Shedd at one point. They are not unknown to each other. Haws, on
the other hand, has been involved in another death penalty case in which there
was a claim that exculpatory evidence was not disclosed. See, Paradis v Arave.
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240 F .3d 169. 5 In addition, Tira Arbaugh alleges in her 1989 letter that Haws
instructed some of her relations to get rid of Marilyn's Calamity Jane rifle. Haws'
name surfaces in Ex. 4 that Shedd authored. His name also appears in both Exs.
7C and D, (though the Court cannot conclude these emails are genuine). The
Court does not know what to make of these ·'coincidences," if they are in fact
coincidences. There remains the possibility someone is trying to smear Haws.
and there remains the possibility that he was somehow involved. Either way, that
brings up the third reason for the Court to avoid making any finding regarding
Unger or Haws or McNeese. Whether they were involved, and if so to what
degree, may be the subject of future proceedings, and the Court chooses not to
make any findings at this point that could be used to support a collateral estoppel
argument for either side.
R. Part 3, p. 137-138.
In the second portion of the proceedings to determine the relevance of the Arbaugh letter,
its admissibility, and if it were admissible what the appropriate remedy would be, the district
court issued a Decision On Motion For Summary Judgment (''Decision"). In the Decision, the
district court concluded that someone directed Shedd, but did not determine who directed Shedd:
The inference from all the evidence is that the Arbaugh letter was known about in
Jerome County by those in law enforcement commencing soon after delivery to
the Jerome County Courthouse in 1989, and it was seized or confiscated or hidden
from Charboneau by unknown persons from that time. The conclusion this leads
to is that Shedd was given a mission by Mark Haws or someone in law
enforcement with an interest in the Charboneau case sometime after that, and
Shedd looked for and seized the Arbaugh letter, and kept it from Charboneau.
R. Part 4, p. 551-552 (emphasis added).
The district court, despite its own finding that cross-exammmg Haws on propensity
evidence related to the Paradis case was inappropriate, found the case relevant in considering
Haws' involvement in directing Shedd.

5

R. Part 3, p. 13 7.

Correct cite 240 F .3d 1169 (9 th Cir. 200 I).
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It also considered the case in

evaluating the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness of the Tira Arbaugh letter:
The ninth circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness is rather coincidental, and
might mean different things to different people. Tira Arbaugh, whether she knew
it or not, bit off quite a chunk in asserting that Marc Haws, the lead prosecuting
attorney assigned to a death penalty case, told her and her family to get rid of a
gun that Tira believes her mom had with her at the time of her murder. She made
that claim in writing in 1989. It would be hard to convince anyone of the truth of
such a claim under the best of circumstances. Tira could not have known when
she wrote that letter that many years later, that same type of claim would be
asserted in another death penalty case against the same attorney. See, Paradis v.
Arave, 130 F.3d 385 (9th Cir.1997). Originally, Donald Paradis and Thomas
Gibson were convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Marc Haws was the
prosecutor. The 9th Circuit determined that his notes of the medical examiner's
opinions regarding the time and location of the victim's death were subject to
th
disclosure under Brady v. Maryland. Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169 (9 Cir.
2001 ). Both men were freed from prison.
R. Part 4, p. 542 (footnote omitted). On both occasions, the case was cited not for a relevant
legal principle, but to point out findings by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding Haws'
conduct.

IV.
a.

ARGUMENTS.

Haws' Due Process Rights Are Implicated By The District Court's Correct
Decision That The Evidence Did Not Support A Finding that Haws
Directed Shedd's Actions.
1.

Standard of Review

Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature and therefore the
applicant must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
On review, the appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual
findings unless the factual findings are clearly erroneous. The credibility
of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
province of the district court. When reviewing mixed questions of law
and fact, this Court will defer to the factual findings of the district court
unless those findings are clearly erroneous. This Court exercises free
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review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts.

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3 rd 376,382 (2004) (citations omitted).

2.

Argument

The district court in both parts of the bifurcated summary judgment proceeding
considered whether someone directed Shedd to withhold information from Respondent, and
twice made a factual finding that insufficient evidence existed to prove who directed Shedd. The
district court specifically did not make a finding in the first portion of the bifurcated proceeding.

It used disjunctive language in finding "that McNeese or someone in a similar capacity directed
Shedd to do what he did." R. Part 3, p. 136. As to Haws, the district court commented that
"there remains the possibility someone is trying to smear Haws, and there remains the possibility
that he was somehow involved." R. Part 3, p. 137.
In the second part of the bifurcated summary judgment proceeding relating to the
admissibility of the Arbaugh letter and an appropriate remedy, the district court again used
disjunctive language to emphasize its ruling that the evidence was insufficient to find who
directed Shedd.
The conclusion this leads to is that Shedd was given a mission by Mark Haws or
someone in law enforcement with an interest in the Charboneau case sometime
after that, and Shedd looked for and seized the Arbaugh letter, and kept it from
Charboneau. This conclusion is no stretch of the evidence by the Court. This is
no more than what Exhibit 4 to the Evidentiary Hearing says, in Shedd 's own
writing. It would be a fair inference to conclude the letter was concealed by those
with a connection to law enforcement after 1989, but it is not possible to say when
that commenced.
R. Part 4, p. 552.
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While the language from the two decisions indicates that the district court considered
McNeese or Haws as more likely than others to have been involved in directing Shedd, the
disjunctive language used by the district court and the district court's focus first on McNeese and
then on Haws as the person most likely to have directed Shedd, supports a finding that the
district court concluded the evidence was insufficient to find either McNeese or Haws
responsible. The district court's language indicating that ''the letter was concealed by those with
a connection to law enforcement" is another indication that the evidence was insufficient for the
district court to find who had directed Shedd. The district court's frustration with the lack of
evidence is apparent in a footnote to its opinion:
A great example of this is that Shedd now gets to claim he doesn't remember
details like who told him to confiscate things from Charboneau's mail, or why he
wrote out and signed Exhibit 4. Now, instead of an all-out (criminal?)
investigation or determined effort to find out who might have actively concealed
information in a death penalty case, the passage of time makes it possible to yawn
and wonder what happened.
R. Part 4, p. 556 n.19.
The district court was clear in its finding that Shedd withheld or concealed the Arbaugh
letter from Respondent. What is equally clear is that the district court found that someone
directed Shedd, but could not find the evidence sufficient to determine who directed Shedd.
Haws worked in the Attorney General's Criminal Division, not for the Department of
Corrections. Haws' involvement in Respondent's case ended after Respondent's first
sentencing. Exhibit 4 does not provide support for a finding that Haws had any involvement in
directing the withholding of documents from Respondent. Nor is there any evidence that Haws
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was notified of documents being withheld. If Shedd was directed by someone to withhold
documents from Respondent, the language of Exhibit 4 lends itself more to a finding that it was
someone in the Department of Co1Tections chain of command. This evidence leads to a
conclusion that the Court should affirm the district court's finding that there was insufficient
evidence to find that Haws directed Shedd.

b.

Haws' Due Process Rights Are Implicated By The District Court
Inappropriately Considering Findings From Paradis v. Arave In
Its Decisions.

The district court correctly sustained Appellant's objections to questions during the crossexamination of Haws regarding findings from the Paradis case. IP AA agrees with Appellant's
position that "[t]he district court erred by conducting an extra-judicial investigation into the facts
of the Paradis case and considering on an ex parte basis evidence it ruled inadmissible." Brief
of Appellant, pp. 72-74. Such a due process violation should not be endorsed by this Court.
In the alternative, should the Court decide that the district court's reliance on the findings
in Paradis to be a reversal of its original decision, despite a lack of anything in the record
explaining such a reversal, IP AA argues that said reliance was an abuse of the district court's
discretion.

1. Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence related to a defendant's prior conduct, this Court applies a twopart standard: '·(I) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant
as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant's character or
criminal propensity; and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court
abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
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defendant."

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8,304 P.3d 276. 283 (2013) (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010)).

The Court can exercise free review of the district court's

relevancy determination. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,229, 178 P.3d 28, 32 (2008).

2. Argument
The Court's findings in Joy support the district court's original conclusion that crossexamination of Haws on the Paradis case was inappropriate. '·[T]o be admissible under Rule
404(b), evidence of prior misconduct must show more than a superficial similarity to the nature
and details of the charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the prior conduct was
planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the charged offense." Id., 155 Idaho at 10,
304 P.3d at 285.
The district court stated in its first written reference to Paradis: "Haws ... has been
involved in another death penalty case in which there was a claim that exculpatory evidence \Vas
not disclosed." R. Pati 3, p. 137. The second reference to Paradis was similar: '·In November
1997. the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part the district court's dismissal or Paradis·
second federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, and remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing on his claims that the prosecution breached its duties under Brady v. Mw:rland .... by
failing to disclose several sets of notes taken by prosecutor Marc Haws:· R. Paii 4, p.

n.12

(citations omitted). The facts in the record do not "demonstrate a planned course of connected
behavior" as required by this Court. Joy. 155 Idaho at 10, 304 P.3d at 285. Further, as noted by
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the district court in its original ruling and supported by this Court, propensity evidence is
inadmissible. "In other words, proof of the alleged anal rape would tend to establish the later
forcible penetration only via the impermissible inference that 'if he did it once, he probably did it
again."' Id., 155 Idaho at 11,304 P.3d at 286.
The district court seemed to draw a parallel in that both cases were death penalty cases
and that Marc Haws was involved in Respondent's prosecution and in Paradis,

A similar

parallel may exist because in Paradis the Ninth Circuit found that notes made by Hmvs were not
disclosed to the defense as required, and here the district court was determining whether Haws
had directed Shedd to withhold or conceal evidence from Respondent. These similarities do not
meet the Joy requirements that the evidence of prior misconduct ··was planned as part of a course
of conduct leading up to'' the suspected conduct.
c.

Haws' Due Process Rights In State Bar Disciplinary Actions Are Implicated
By The District Court's Decisions.

Section V of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules sets forth the rules relating to Professional
Conduct, including the procedure for disciplinary proceedings.

Due process relating to

allegations of misconduct is provided by proper adherence to those rules.
While a finding that an attorney committed an act that could be a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct is not dispositive in an investigation by Bar Counsel. it could certainly
provide suppmi for a finding detrimental to the attorney. A lack of clarity regarding vvhether an
attorney was found to have acted inappropriately leaves room for a finding by Bar Counsel under
Rule 509 of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules that an investigation is justified to determine if the
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attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Clarity in describing findings relating to
conduct of Marc Haws in directing, or not directing, Shedd is important in this matter and
important to Haws because of the potential for disciplinary proceedings. !PAA has an interest in
seeing that where a prosecuting attorney is accused of misconduct, clarity is achieved regarding a
court's findings.
A court's finding that a prosecuting attorney committed an act that is, or could be deemed
to be, a violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, can have a significant impact on
that person's good name, reputation, honor, integrity, and ability to make a living. The stigma of
such a finding is evident in this case where Respondent's counsel attempted to question Haws on
the findings in Paradis, and the district court referred to those same findings in its decisions. Bar
Counsel, under Rule 509, can consider a finding of misconduct in evaluating whether to conduct
an investigation, and in determining if there are grounds for sanctions.
Here the district court, without saying so specifically, found that the evidence did not
support a conclusion that Haws directed Shedd. IPAA's request is for the Court to affirm the
district court with a more definitive statement. Clarification will avoid any confusion and the
possibility that inappropriate inferences can be drawn in later proceedings, including a
disciplinary proceeding.
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V.

CONCLUSION.

In this matter the Court should determine that the district court inappropriately considered
evidence outside the record.

If the Court determines that despite its own finding that the

evidence was inadmissible, the district court later reversed itself and deemed the evidence
admitted, it was done so in violation of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

Regardless of that

determination, the Court should affim1 the trial court's ruling that the evidence did not support a
finding that Haws directed Shedd to withhold or conceal evidence.
A trial court's findings in relation to alleged misconduct can impact the case in which it is
being considered, and can have serious repercussions for a prosecutor outside of the case.
Complaints to the Idaho State Bar can be bolstered by a court's findings. In this case the frtcts
support the district court's rulings that the evidence was insufficient to find Haws directed
Shedd. To the contrary, the evidence supports a finding that if Shedd was directed, it more likely
by someone else. This Court should affirm and clarify consistent with that result.
Dated this _ _ _ day of October, 2015.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Barry McHugh
Prosecuting Attorney
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